The adaptive rationality of interpersonal commitment by Back, Istvan & Flache, Andreas
  
 University of Groningen
The adaptive rationality of interpersonal commitment





IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2008
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Back, I., & Flache, A. (2008). The adaptive rationality of interpersonal commitment. Rationality and Society,
20(1), 65-83. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463107085437
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
http://rss.sagepub.com
Rationality and Society 
DOI: 10.1177/1043463107085437 
 2008; 20; 65 Rationality and Society
István Back and Andreas Flache 
 The Adaptive Rationality of Interpersonal Commitment
http://rss.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/20/1/65
 The online version of this article can be found at:
 Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com
 can be found at:Rationality and Society Additional services and information for 





 at University of Groningen on November 12, 2009 http://rss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
THE ADAPTIVE RATIONALITY OF
INTERPERSONAL COMMITMENT
István Back and Andreas Flache
ABSTRACT
Why are people inclined to build friendships and maintain durable, non-
reproductive relationships? Previous computational modeling work
showed that it can be an efficient survival strategy to choose interaction
partners based on relationship length, even if, as a consequence, indi-
viduals become unconditionally cooperative in long-term relationships
(interpersonal commitment). Such committed individuals can outper-
form conditional cooperators who play in a fair, reciprocal manner (e.g.
tit for tat). However, previous studies did not conduct a sufficiently strict
test of the viability of commitment because they did not account for
exploiters who specifically take advantage of the tolerance of commit-
ment players. We allow for this by extending previous studies with the
possibility of randomly mutating strategies under evolutionary pres-
sures, and thus give a much larger coverage of an infinite strategy space.
Our results point to the lack of stable strategies: we find that emerging
populations alternate between temporarily stable states. We also show
that the viability of strategies increases with increasing levels of inter-
personal commitment, and that the effect of interpersonal commitment
on viability is larger than the effect of fairness. 
KEY WORDS • interpersonal commitment • fairness • reciprocity •
agent-based model • evolution
1. Introduction
Of the species of the earth, humans exhibit the highest level of cooperation
between genetically unrelated individuals (Gintis 2003). Arguably, cooper-
ation is the de facto key to our evolutionary success. At the same time,
cooperation is problematic to explain from a rational actor perspective.
Self-interested actors often face a ‘social dilemma’ (Dawes 1980), where
the rational pursuit of individual interests may lead them toward defection,
while this in turn entails collectively undesirable outcomes. Game theory
Rationality and Society Copyright © 2008 Sage Publications. Vol. 20(1): 65–83.
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has identified repeated interaction as an important solution for the problem.
In a world of harsh competition, repeated encounters reduce uncertainty
about the trustworthiness of interaction partners (shadow of the past), while
at the same time they create a strategic incentive for cooperation (shadow
of the future) (Axelrod 1984; Buskens and Raub 2002; Friedman 1971).
Thus durable relationships are expected to be a hotbed of cooperation even
in the absence of central enforcement because they provide incentives both
to trust others and to honor others’ trust. 
From this perspective, it is hardly surprising that rational incentives to
become committed to long-term cooperative exchange partners are particu-
larly strong in uncertain environments (Kollock 1994; Schüssler 1989). A
reduction in uncertainty is often more valuable than a probabilistic increase
in payoff from a potential new partner, especially if switching itself is risky
or costly or alternatives are scarce. This can explain why in situations where
uncertainty may otherwise preclude the desirable outcome of mutual coop-
eration, social actors often restrict their own freedom of action by using
commitment devices such as posting a hostage (Raub 2004). However, this
rational explanation of interpersonal commitment behavior is hard to rec-
oncile with the empirical evidence that people tend to stay committed to
long-term interaction partners even when (1) alternatives are available, (2)
switching costs are low, and (3) uncertainty is of less concern. 
A growing body of empirical findings from both interpersonal relation-
ships research (Karreman et al. 2003; Wieselquist et al. 1999) and
exchange experiments (Kollock 1994; Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996) shows
that people have a tendency to remain cooperative to interaction partners
who are occasionally uncooperative. Moreover, people tend to keep
exchanging with the same partner even if more valuable (or less costly)
alternatives are available. Such commitments also imply forgiveness and
gift-giving without any explicit demand for reciprocation (Lawler 2001;
Lawler and Yoon 1993). People help friends and acquaintances in trouble,
apparently without calculating present costs and future benefits. Another,
extreme example is the case of battered women who stay with their abu-
sive husbands (Rusbult and Martz 1995; Rusbult et al. 1998).
In this article we seek an explanation by following the general lead of
the ‘indirect evolutionary approach’ (Güth and Kliemt 1998), which
posits that individuals act rationally in the light of their preferences but
also assumes that in the course of biological and cultural evolution indi-
viduals with emotions and social preferences – e.g. for fair distributions
(cf. Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), or for altruistic punishment (cf. Fehr
and Gächter 2002) – may have had a selective advantage, because their
preferences produce more viable outcomes than those of pure egoists.
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This approach aims to integrate the endogenous explanation of such non-
selfish preferences with the classical rational choice assumption that
humans act (boundedly) rationally, given their preferences. The core idea
is that preferences are embodied in the genotype and guide individual
actions. Subjective preferences may be harmful to the individual or to the
population but genotypes are selected on the basis of objective conse-
quences of the actions that preferences produce. As preferences undergo
selection and mutation, infeasible and harmful preferences gradually
become less widespread in the population, giving way to more ‘rational’
sets of preferences. However, while the indirect evolutionary approach
has proven to be a fruitful way of explaining phenomena such as emo-
tional commitment to a certain course of action, altruistic punishment, or
cooperation in the production of collective goods (Frank 1998; Gintis
2003; Güth and Kliemt 1998; Güth and Ockenfels 2002) the phenome-
non of interpersonal commitment has received less attention. 
Recently, some authors have begun to use the indirect evolutionary
approach to explain interpersonal commitment (Back and Flache 2006;
de Vos et al. 2001; de Vos and Zeggelink 1997; Zeggelink et al. 2000).
While these analyses suggested that commitment may have been evolu-
tionarily viable, we argue that the tests they used were not strict enough.
De Vos and his collaborators argued in a series of papers that in a styl-
ized ‘ancestral environment’ a strategy based on commitment behavior
can outperform a strategy based on calculative reciprocity when both
strategies are in competition with one defecting strategy. Researchers
modeled commitment as unconditional cooperativeness with a particu-
lar partner after some initial cooperative actions of the partner. By con-
trast, calculative reciprocity (based on fairness principles) continuously
keeps track of its interaction balance with alters (partners) and adjusts
its cooperativeness accordingly. Using an ecological simulation model,
Back and Flache (2006) extended the de Vos model by introducing vari-
ation in the extent to which a strategy follows commitment or calcula-
tive reciprocity behavior. This study showed that ‘strong’ commitment
strategies outperform ‘weaker’ forms of commitment and various versions
of calculative reciprocators under a wide range of conditions. However,
a remaining major limitation of these analyses is that the spontaneous
emergence of more sophisticated strategies was not considered. In par-
ticular, the possibility was precluded that sophisticated cheaters could
emerge who optimally take advantage of the cooperativeness of com-
mitment. Whether and to what extent this may be possible is crucial for
the validity of an explanation of interpersonal commitment behavior in
terms of its evolutionary advantages in the human ancestral environment. 
BACK & FLACHE: INTERPERSONAL COMMITMENT 67
 at University of Groningen on November 12, 2009 http://rss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Accordingly, in the present article we provide a better test of evolution-
ary explanations for commitment by extending previous analyses with ran-
dom mutation of strategies. In Section 2, we present our computational
model and formulate conjectures. Section 3 contains the results of simula-
tion experiments, followed by a discussion and conclusions in Section 4.
2. Model
We use an abstract decision situation that we call the Delayed Exchange
Dilemma (see Back and Flache 2006; de Vos et al. 2001), or DED for
short. The DED builds on the well-known repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
but contains two major extensions. First, it puts the problem of coopera-
tion into a sequential exchange perspective, which is essentially a gener-
alization of simultaneous exchange. Second, and more important, is that
it presents agents with the dilemma of choosing between interaction part-
ners (see also, e.g., Hayashi and Yamagishi 1998). With these extensions
the DED becomes ideal for studying commitment-related behavior in
uncertain environments. 
The DED is played by n agents in successive rounds. Initially, all agents
are endowed with fi points. At the beginning of each round Nature strikes
a number of agents, each with a given individually independent proba-
bility Pd, who become in need of help from other agents. Agents who are
struck by Nature are the initiators of interactions. Each of them asks
another agent for help, which is either provided or not. Providing help
costs fh points. Moreover, help giving is time-consuming. Each agent can
only provide help once during one round and only agents who are not
distressed themselves may provide help. If a help request is turned down,
the distressed agent may ask another agent for help but not more than m
agents altogether within the same round, due to time restrictions. If an
agent does not get help before the end of the round, it experiences fd loss
in points. If the points of an agent fall below a critical threshold fc, the
agent dies.
To explicitly study the evolutionary viability of commitment and fair
reciprocity, we model preferences as a combination of commitment-related
traits, fairness-related traits and a general cooperativeness trait. These traits
determine the extent to which agents base their decisions on commitment-
or fairness-related aspects of a decision situation. Equipped with these
preferences agents decide about cooperation and also about choosing inter-
action partners. 
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In particular, agents may face two different types of decision situations
repeatedly in the DED. When they are hit by distress, they have to select
an interaction partner to ask help from. On the other hand, when they
themselves are asked to provide help, they need to decide whether to pro-
vide it and in the case of multiple requests whom to provide it to. In both
cases, agents order possible interaction partners according to the attrac-
tiveness of interacting with them. Attractiveness is based on the individ-
ual preferences agents have with regard to past interaction histories. 
The attractiveness of agent aj for giving help to, calculated by agent ai,
is formalized as:
UijG = commiG · INTFREQij + fairiG · INTBALij + coopi, (1)
where commiG is the preference for commitment in giving, fairiG is the
preference for fairness in giving, and coopi is the preference for general
cooperativeness. INTFREQij is the proportion of cooperative interac-
tions1 ai had with aj compared to the total number of cooperative interac-
tions ai had with all agents in the population. A cooperative interaction is
defined as an interaction in which either ai helped aj or ai received help
from aj. INTBALij is the standardized interaction balance between agents
ai and aj. To obtain this measure, we took into account both the balance
of helps and the balance of refusals. The reason is that neither help bal-
ance nor refusal balance alone is sufficient to guarantee an overall bal-
ance in the exchange relationship. For example, suppose ai helped aj
equally often as aj helped ai but ai refused to help aj 10 times more often
than aj refused to help ai. Despite the equal amount of help given, this
exchange relationship clearly cannot be considered perfectly in balance.
Technically, we calculated the measure as follows. We subtracted from
1.0 a measure of the overall standardized imbalance. The overall stan-
dardized imbalance is obtained by adding the difference between the
number of times ai received help from aj and ai gave help to aj, and the
difference between the number of times ai refused to give help to aj and
aj refused to give help to ai, and dividing this by the total number of inter-
actions they had. 
When comparing INTFREQ and INTBAL, notice that while a commit-
ted agent ai will find an interaction partner aj more attractive the more
often it helped aj, a fair agent will be negatively influenced by the same
fact. Note also that, for simplicity, this model treats the impact of help-
ing and refusing to help on the interaction balance as equally large. 
In the actual implementation, every time an agent has to make a deci-
sion, there is also a probability Pe that the agent will not use the above
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utility calculation but will choose randomly from the set of available
decisions, each being equally likely. This random error models noise in
communication, misperception of the situation or simply miscalculation
of the utility by the agent. Taking this random error into account increases
the robustness of our results to noise. 
The attractiveness of agent aj for asking help from is defined in a sim-
ilar way, the difference being that agents may put different weights on
the two history-specific decision parameters, and that there is no coop-
erativeness parameter:
UijA = commiA · INTFREQij + fairiA · INTBALij, (2)
Before agents make a decision, be it help giving or help asking, they
calculate the corresponding one of these two types of attractiveness
respectively for each agent who asked for help (UG), or for each other
agent in the population (UA). In the case of help giving, they choose a
partner with the highest attractiveness, if that attractiveness is above an
agent-specific threshold uti. Notice that INTFREQij and INTBALij are
always smaller than or equal to 1. We allow commi, fairi and coopi to take
values from [−1; 1]. Thus we allow the attractiveness threshold uit to take
values from [−3; 3].
If the attractiveness of all possible agents is below the threshold attrac-
tiveness, no help is given to anyone. Otherwise, if there is more than one
other agent with highest attractiveness,2 the agent selects one of the others
with equal probability. In the case of help seeking, agents also choose a
partner with the highest attractiveness but there is no threshold, i.e. agents
in distress always ask someone for help. 
Definition 1. (Strategy) A strategy is a combination of four traits for
help-giving behavior (commG, fairG, coop, ut) and two traits for help-
asking behavior (commA, fairA).
The heart of our model is an evolutionary dynamic that captures random
mutation of strategies and selection of objectively successful ones. The
implementation of this process is based on the replicator dynamics
(Taylor and Jonker 1978). Broadly, the replicator dynamics dictate that
if a generation of genotypes (strategies) undergoes reproduction, the net
reproduction rate of a genotype is proportional to its relative success com-
pared to other genotypes in the current generation. Genotypes which
perform below average, in particular, have a negative reproduction rate.
In our case, genotypes (strategies) represent subjective preferences. 
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To prevent a population from growing without bounds, thus modeling
resource scarcity in an implicit way, we keep the size of the population
constant, in the following way. At the end of each round we count how
many agents have died and replace them with new agents in the next
round. Each new agent A has the same strategy as a randomly selected
other agent B, present in the population who has reached a minimum 
age n (measured in the number of interactions it had). The probability 
of choosing this other agent B is proportionate to the share of points 
B holds within the group of all agents older than n. Before A is added to
the population, with probability P
mut, its strategy may undergo mutation.
A mutation occurs in exactly one, randomly chosen trait, with equal
probabilities for all traits, thus P = 1-9 for each trait. The new value of the
trait is a uniformly distributed random value from the interval [−3; 3] for
the attractiveness threshold, and from [−1; 1]for all other traits.
3. Conjectures
To guide the simulation experiments, in the following we formulate a
number of conjectures derived from previous work. 
Definition 2. (Stability) Stability of a strategy s is equal to the number
of consecutive rounds it existed in a population in a given simula-
tion run, counting from the first round it appeared until the round in
which it became extinct. A strategy s is infinitely stable if it does not
become extinct. 
Generalizing from analytical results about the evolutionary stability of
strategies in repeated games that are simpler than the DED (cf. Bender
and Swistak 2001), we expect that there is no single strategy that is supe-
rior to all others in the dilemma we study. In other words, for every
incumbent strategy there exists another (mutant) strategy that can take
advantage of the incumbent’s weakness. 
Conjecture 1. There is no infinitely stable strategy in an infinitely played
game of DED.
Nevertheless, the length of time a strategy exists (stability) carries an
important message about its viability. Since mutations constantly arise
and threaten to push other strategies out of the population, stability is an
indicator for the number of attacks a strategy could withstand. Therefore,
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stability of a strategy will be one of the indicators of its viability.3 The
other measure is typical longevity within a strategy (variable longevity,
the average age at death of agents belonging to a strategy). Note that in
our model, there is no upper age limit on reproducibility, in other words,
agents keep reproducing until they die, which makes longevity a suitable
measure for viability. 
Back and Flache (2006) found that the most successful strategies in the
DED exhibited some level of interpersonal commitment and that com-
mitted agents outcompeted fair reciprocators. These results suggest the
following two conjectures, which we will test under the new assumption
of random mutation:
Conjecture 2. Individual preferences for interpersonal commitment and
fairness have a positive effect on viability.
Conjecture 3. The positive effect of commitment preferences on viabil-
ity is stronger than the effect of fairness preferences. 
According to de Vos et al. (2001) commitment works best under harsh
conditions: the more agents are challenged by Nature to survive, the
more compelled they are to cooperate with each other in durable rela-
tionships. More technically, they found that the larger the probability of
distress, the larger the proportion of commitment strategies surviving,
relative to the defector strategy. This leads us to test:
Conjecture 4. Environmental harshness has a positive interaction effect
on stability with the level of cooperation and interpersonal commit-
ment of a strategy.
4. Results
Binmore (1998) argued forcefully that the outcome of computer tourna-
ments and simulations of evolutionary dynamics strongly depends on the
set of strategies that are initially present in a population. To avoid our
results becoming biased by a restrictive set of starting conditions, we ran a
large number of replications of our simulation runs, each time with a pop-
ulation whose initial strategy is randomly chosen from the strategy space
defined by the six traits. We did not find any significant effects of features
of initial starting strategies on the outcomes of simulation runs. The reason
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is that soon after the initial rounds of a simulation run, mutation ensures the
emergence of a large variety of different strategies in the population. 
We allow this population to play the DED game. In the course of the
game agents start to lose points, some of them eventually die, while others
reproduce. At some point, random mutations occur in the initial strategy,
creating a potential invader. The better a mutated strategy performs in the
DED compared to agents of the original strategy, the larger is its probabil-
ity of reproducing and increasing its proportion within the agent population.
The simulation run ends with either the extinction of all agents4 or after an
arbitrarily chosen large number of rounds (10 million). We then repeat the
simulation run with another, randomly generated initial population. 
During each simulation run we record all strategies and their key char-
acteristics that have ever appeared through random mutations. These char-
acteristics include on the individual level the traits of the strategy (commA,
fairt, coop, ut, commG, fairG); the average longevity measured in rounds of
game play on the strategy level; and finally a population-level variable
measuring the overall level of cooperation and defection (SOCCOOP).5
Initial parameters
To preserve the comparability of our results we started our simulations
with the same initial parameters (where applicable) that were used in
earlier work. These are Pd = 0.2, fh = 1, fd = 20, fi = 100, fc = 0, N = 25,
Pe = 0.05, m = 2. (For the meaning of each parameter consult the Model
section above.) These parameters impose a set of conditions under which
for strictly instrumental agents the choice between purposeful defection
and (conditional) cooperation is as difficult as possible. The parameters
are determined such that in a simplified two-person version of the game,
perfectly rational actors would be indifferent between choosing a condi-
tionally cooperative and a fully defecting strategy if they meet a condi-
tionally cooperative partner. In this way, we implement a setting in which
the problem of cooperation is particularly hard to solve and thus provide a
strict test of the viability of cooperative strategies, including commitment
and fairness. If cooperation placed an excessively high burden on agents,
or, conversely, if cooperation entailed no real sacrifices, the model would
hardly yield any interesting insights. (For the detailed game theoretical
derivation using trigger strategies see Back and Flache 2006.) We refer to
this parameter setting as the baseline condition. After obtaining results for
the baseline condition, we conduct experiments in which we systematically
vary the level of environmental harshness (fd). Furthermore, we run 
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additional experiments with varying parameter combinations to test the
sensitivity of the results to variation in model parameters. 
Stability
In support of conjecture 1, our simulation results show that strategies
keep changing endlessly in all initial parameter settings – we found no
infinitely stable strategy in the DED. We simulated 175 runs altogether,
each of which started with a different randomly chosen initial strategy
and consisted of maximally 10,000,000 rounds. During these runs more
than 4.7 million mutations took place altogether, generating as many
strategies. However, in none of these runs have we recorded any strategy
that existed longer than 220,000 rounds. 
We may of course simply have not encountered the infinitely stable
strategies during our random walks in this vast strategy space. However,
judging by the vast coverage of the strategy space by our method, this
seems implausible. 
A plausible explanation for the lack of infinitely stable strategies is that
for each strategy there exists a better response that takes advantage of the
strategy’s weakness. Sooner or later mutations generate this better response
and the original strategy is gradually pushed out of existence. If a strategy
is too cooperative, opportunistic exploiters take advantage of this and flour-
ish. Later, in a harsh world of mainly exploiters, where everybody is suffer-
ing, two cooperators who appear randomly at the same time and find each
other will survive and reproduce more easily than others, given that they
have a sound method of excluding defectors from cooperative interactions. 
That cooperativeness eventually declines again may be explained by
the gradual loss of the ability to exclude defectors through ‘evolutionary
drift’ (e.g. Bendor and Swistak 2001) or by the emergence of new defect-
ing mutants who have developed the ability to behave such that they are
not excluded from exchanges between incumbent cooperators. Figure 1
illustrates these dynamics of average age at death and helping behavior,
for a typical simulation run. The upper part of the figure shows how the
average age at death (measured in interactions) changes over time within
one simulation round. Compare this with the level of cooperation, gener-
ated for the same simulation run, in the lower part of the figure: periods
of high refusal rates coincide with short lives. 
The importance of interpersonal commitment
Conjectures 2 and 3 relate the strength of the commitment preference
within a strategy directly to viability, the average length of agents’ life
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within a strategy. Commitment is measured by the commG and commA
traits, distinguished for giving and asking respectively. The higher these
traits are, within the [−1;1] interval, the more an agent is inclined to choose
and cooperate with long-term interaction partners. If they are positive, the
agent has a preference for commitment; if they are negative, the agent has
a preference against being committed; and when the values are close to
zero, the agent is indifferent to the concept of commitment. 
What we find is that among the most stable 1355 strategies (where sta-
bility is at least 50,000 rounds), 776 strategies (57.3%) are positive on
both commitment traits. Among the same strategies, only 385 (28.4%)
are positive on both fairG and fairA, and 717 (52.9%) on coop. This sug-
gests that if a strategy is highly stable, its decision-making process is
likely to be guided by preferences for unconditional cooperation with old
interaction partners. These preferences appear to be far more important
for success than being fair or simply being cooperative (coop trait). 
To get a closer insight into the separate contributions of the traits to a
strategy’s success and to compare in particular the relative importance of
the fairG and fairA traits to the importance of the commG and commA traits,
we conducted a linear regression analysis with average longevity within
a strategy as the dependent variable (see Table 1). Before performing the
analysis we filtered out highly unstable strategies (STAB < 2000 rounds)
and strategies with low longevity (longevity < 75 interactions). The rea-
son for filtering out highly unstable strategies is that, due to the stochas-
tic nature of the simulation, it often happens that strategies that would
otherwise be stable cannot grow to a critical mass in the population to
stabilize. In this case, they distort the association between strategy fea-
tures and viability. The reduced sample consisted of 34,143 strategies. 
We estimate three models (see Table 1), gradually extending the set
of independent variables included. With the first model we test the
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effects of the strength of preferences on viability. The second model adds
environmental harshness and its interaction effects; while the third model
adds interaction effects between similar preferences. In the first model we
see that the effects of having preferences for commitment and for fairness
in giving are both positive but the effect of the commitment preference is
larger, as expected based on conjectures 2 and 3. We also see that the coop-
eration preference has a very large effect. Preferences in asking are nega-
tive but for fairness the coefficient is much larger in absolute value. This
suggests that strategies that restrict their partner search too much either to
old partners or to partners with balanced exchange ratios are disadvantaged
because their search space is overly reduced. The attractiveness threshold
ut has a very large negative effect. The explanation is that ut is very impor-
tant in deciding whether a strategy is initially cooperating or defecting
(niceness). This in turn is crucial for the ability to bind future helping part-
ners or establish mutually cooperative balanced exchange relationships. 
In Model 2 we include the main and interaction effects of environ-
mental harshness (fd, cost of not getting help). To test the sensitivity of
our result to the choice of environmental harshness, we repeated our
76 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 20(1)
Table 1. OLS regression with dependent variable longevity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Unstandardized Unstandardized Unstandardized 
coefficients coefficients coefficients
B Std. Error B Std. Error B Std. Error
(Constant) 97.035** (0.088) 97.325* (0.233) 97.510** (0.230)
commG 1.754** (0.128) 1.272** (0.144) 1.136** (0.144)
fairG 1.393* (0.134) 0.143 (0.165) 0.043 (0.162)
coop 5.625** (0.126) 5.752** (0.134) 5.770** (0.132)
commA −0.754** (0.129) −0.651** (0.129) −0.560** (0.128)
fairA −4.340** (0.135) −4.556** (0.136) −3.798** (0.136)
ut −6.798** (0.051) −6.920** (0.076) −6.963** (0.075)
fd 0.038 (0.019) −0.006 (0.018)
commG × fd −0.456** (0.068) −0.507** (0.068)
fairG × fd −1.106** (0.076) −1.284** (0.075)
commG × commA 0.639** (0.074)
fairG × fairA −2.415** (0.076)
R R2-adj. R R2-adj. R R2-adj.
0.670 0.448 0.673 0.452 0.685 0.469
Note:** Significant at the p < 0.001 level.
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simulations for a range of parameters. Namely, we were interested in the
effect of variation in the proportion of the cost of cooperation and the
cost of being cheated. We reran the simulation with fd = 5, 10, 20, 30 and
added these repetitions to the original dataset obtained in the baseline
condition. Then we tested for significant effects of fd on the dependent
variable LONGEVITY.
What we see is that although its main effect is not significant, there are
negative interaction effects with fairG and commG but with fairG the effect
is much larger. The negative interaction with commG is clearly inconsis-
tent with conjecture 4 and thus with the results previous studies (e.g. de
Vos et al. 2001) reported for models without mutation. At the same time
harshness is less of a problem for commitment players than for fairness
players. While the net effect of commG remains positive (including the
main effect), fairG no longer has a significant main effect. One interpreta-
tion is that whatever beneficial effect a preference for fairness may have,
the effect is strongly mitigated when the environment is harsh. This is con-
sistent with the explanation that Back and Flache (2006) gave for the
weaker performance of fairness strategies in their experiments. Fairness
players tend to avoid unbalanced exchange accounts by spreading their
help requests across a large number of potential partners. However, the
harsher the environment, the more likely it is that help requests are directed
by multiple help seekers at the same target. Accordingly, in harsh envi-
ronments fairness players are likely to lose more points than commitment
players, who coordinate their requests in a more efficient way. 
Finally, in Model 3 we control for the interaction effects between being
committed in both giving and asking and being fair in both giving and ask-
ing. This helps us understand whether having consistent preferences for
both giving and asking has an impact on the dependent variable. While for
commitment the effect is relatively small but positive, the effect for fair-
ness is much larger and is in a negative direction. In addition, the interac-
tion effect between the commitment traits slightly outweighs the negative
effect of commA. This suggests that, in terms of viability, it is disadvanta-
geous to be committed in giving but not in asking (or vice versa) but such
a mismatch in fairness preferences is nonetheless beneficial. This intu-
itively makes sense: if you have friends you usually ask for help, you also
want to give them help when they ask, and vice versa.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
In this article we examined the arms race between two tactics for coopera-
tion under evolutionary pressures. One of them is conditional cooperation
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or reciprocity (cf. Axelrod 1984), the other one is commitment. The
simple idea behind conditional cooperation is this: ‘Be cooperative but
retaliate against those who cheated on you before.’ Since Axelrod (1984),
conditions that may trigger retaliation (defection) have been refined and
sophisticated, adapting conditional cooperation to various challenges,
such as asymmetric uncertainty and random noise. 
In contrast with conditional cooperation, commitment is based on a
very different idea: ‘Be generally cooperative but always favor long-
term exchange partners.’ Thus, the main question for commitment is not
to decide whether to cooperate or defect but to select exchange partners.
At first this seems to make commitment excessively cooperative, and
vulnerable to exploitation. In a large enough interdependent population,
however, partner selection substitutes the need for explicit punishment. 
Previous computational modeling work (Back and Flache 2006; de
Vos et al. 2001; de Vos and Zeggelink 1997; Zeggelink et al. 2000) has
pointed to the evolutionary advantages of commitment under conditions
resembling the human ancestral environment. In this article, we reported
a stricter test of the underlying evolutionary explanation. Unlike previous
work, our computational study allowed for the random mutation of com-
peting strategies and thus implemented a much tougher evolutionary
selection to which both fairness and commitment strategies were
exposed. Under this stricter test, our results still point to certain evolu-
tionary advantages of interpersonal commitment but the findings also
highlight weaknesses of commitment and put the results of earlier
research into perspective. We found that, under the postulated conditions
of the ancestral environment, traits both for commitment and for fairness
in giving increase viability, and, as expected, helping old interaction part-
ners (commitment) was more important than helping in a fair, reciprocal
way. At the same time, we found that tendencies for both commitment
and fairness have negative effects when it comes to seeking help. This
suggests that previous studies may have overemphasized the evolution-
ary advantages of commitment. We found that it is beneficial for agents
to bind potential partners (commitment in helping) but it is disadvanta-
geous to restrict the search for help too much to these partners (commit-
ment in seeking). In a similar vein, our results are also inconsistent with
the argument of de Vos et al. (2001) that environmental harshness
strengthens the effects of commitment. Instead, we found that the posi-
tive effects of commitment on survival weaken when the environment
becomes harsher. However, we could show that commitment players are
less affected by harshness than are fairness players. 
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Our study has both supported and refined evolutionary accounts of
interpersonal commitment. At the same time, this previous work has its
limitations, some of which we believe do not affect the central conclu-
sions, while others point to a need for future research. Previous theoret-
ical work may suggest, in particular, that the viability of commitment is
seriously hampered by the ‘dyadic’ nature of this strategy. Bendor and
Swistak (2001) have shown that dyadic strategies (strategies that only
sanction defections that cause harm to the sanctioner) can never be evo-
lutionarily stable, while ‘social strategies’ that also sanction non-
cooperation between third parties are stable. In a nutshell, the reason is
that social strategies leave no room for benefiting from second-order
free riding because a second-order free-rider would be punished by
every compliant group member. However, we believe that this is not a
serious problem for our theory of (dyadic) commitment. While dyadic
strategies are not eternally stable, it has also been shown that reciprocal
dyadic strategies (including commitment) can be relatively more stable
(but not perfectly stable) compared to non-reciprocal strategies. At the
same time, Bendor and Swistak (2001) do not deny that social strategies
impose a higher burden of cognitive complexity and information gath-
ering on agents than do dyadic strategies. To the extent that this creates
fitness costs, the advantage of social strategies may turn into a disad-
vantage. Moreover, social strategies may be relatively more vulnerable
to environmental uncertainty and noise, because ‘erroneous’ defections
may disrupt more relationships than just the dyad in which they
occurred. In sum, while – consistently with our results – Bendor and
Swistak’s argument implies that the dyadic strategy of commitment is
not eternally stable, it is plausible to assume that at least under uncer-
tainty conditions it also has some fitness advantages as compared to
social strategies. 
A more obvious limitation of our work is the lack of a direct empiri-
cal test for the existence of a commitment trait in contemporary societies.
To be sure, while we presented a theoretical argument for a preference
for building committed relationships, this work was motivated by labo-
ratory research that showed that commitment in exchange is positively
related to uncertainty (Kollock 1994). Moreover, it has been demon-
strated that people attach positive feelings to the mere existence of long-
term exchange relationships, in addition to the material benefits that
result from them (Lawler 2001; Lawler and Yoon 1993). In a similar
vein, Smaniotto (2004) showed, using scenario experiments, that sub-
jects are more willing to provide help and to report emotions of com-
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mitment, if a scenario provides ‘commitment cues’ such as another
person being in need, or being a friend. More recently, neurobiology is
turning its interest to uncovering traits and mechanisms underlying
human sociability and affiliation. Kosfeld et al. (2005) managed to arti-
ficially increase the level of trust, a key element in committed relation-
ships, by administering oxytocin, a hormone that acts as a neurotransmitter
in the brain, to participants of an experiment. Animal research on mam-
mals suggests that social bonding can be modulated by various hor-
mones, including oxytocin, vasopressin, opioids, corticotropin-releasing
hormone, dopamine and adrenal steroids, including corticosterone or
cortisol (c.f Carter 2005). Even more to the point, Depue and Morrone-
Strupinsky (2005) provide support for the existence of a neurobiologi-
cal system in humans that regulates reward via opiate functioning when
people create and dissolve social bonds. 
But all these findings do not give sufficient insight yet into the underly-
ing mechanism or trait for interpersonal commitment. In particular they do
not allow us to disentangle conclusively rational commitment and our indi-
rect evolutionary explanation that posits ‘irrational’ emotions as a proxi-
mate mechanism driving commitment. It is of course impossible to
empirically test an ultimate (evolutionary) explanation for commitment.
But future work should devise tests, such as laboratory experiments, that
allow us to rule out rival hypotheses derived from competing proximate
explanations for commitment. In order to test whether a positive feeling,
i.e. a preference for commitment, exists as a possible evolutionary remnant
in contemporary populations, it is of key importance to find support for at
least two hypotheses. The first is that the preference for commitment is sta-
ble across situations with varying materialistic payoffs, i.e. people behave
according to the preference even when this is not in their rational self-inter-
est. And the second is that the preference is stable across different cultures. 
To conclude, there is reason to believe that humans may have been
selected for some form of commitment behavior in their evolutionary past.
One possible explanation for the success of commitment that we offer is
the following. Both conditional cooperation and commitment have a ten-
dency to cooperate, which is the only recipe for success under conditions
of high interdependence and uncertainty. They both have a method to
exclude defectors from the bliss of cooperative interactions: conditional
cooperation retaliates against defectors, while commitment leaves them for
better partners. This means that commitment does not purposefully defect
when it is able to help. Or, from another perspective, while conditional
cooperation operates by punishment, commitment operates by reward. 
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Appendix: Pseudocode
The evolutionary process, executed at the end of each run:
...
end of round 
begin evolutionary process 
for each dead agent A 
choose with a probability equal to its fitness
share within N-old agents an agent B who is
alive and is at least N-old 
generate a new agent C with a strategy identical
to that of B 
mutate the strategy of C with a probability Pmut
end for
end evolutionary process 
start of new round 
...
NOTES
1. Interactions take place always between exactly two agents. Possible interactions are
giving help (cooperation) and refusing to help (defection). Asking for help is always
followed by one of these.
2. This is unlikely, as the preference parameters are high-precision real values and inter-
action histories tend to differ with time.
3. We will not use here stability concepts from the evolutionary game theory literature
(e.g., evolutionary stability or asymptotic stability) because they do not allow the
expression of the relative stability of strategies.
4. Extinction is possible if all agents die within one round and thus there is no basis for
the distribution of strategies in the next generation.
5. SOCCOOP measures the difference between the per-round average number of coop-
eration (helps) and defection (refusals) in the entire population.
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